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Abstract—Bitcoin, as a decentralized digital currency, has
caused extensive research interest. There are many studies based
on related protocols on Bitcoin, Bitcoin-based voting protocols
also received attention in related literature.
In this paper, we propose a Bitcoin-based decentralized
privacy-preserving voting mechanism. It is assumed that there are
n voters and m candidates. The candidate who obtains t ballots
can get x Bitcoins from each voter, namely nx Bitcoins in total.
We use a shuffling mechanism to protect voter’s voting privacy,
at the same time, decentralized threshold signatures were used
to guarantee security and assign voting rights. The protocol can
achieve correctness, decentralization and privacy-preservings. By
contrast with other schemes, our protocol has a smaller number
of transactions and can achieve a more functional voting method.
Index Terms—Bitcoin; Anonymous voting; shuffling mecha-
nism
I. INTRODUCTION
Voting plays an important role in modern life. Electronic
voting has aroused the attention of many scholars for a long
time. However, how to design a voting protocol which is
decentered and privacy-preserving is an open issue. Bitcoin
[1], as a new type of decentralized digital currency, has a wide
range of applications in the fields of voting [2]–[4], secure
multiparty computations [5], public randomness source [6] and
designing fair protocols [7].
In the field of voting, Zhao and Chan [3] first proposed
how to vote privately using Bitcoin. There are n voters that
each has 1 Bitcoin and votes for 2 candidates. The winner can
obtain all the n Bitcoins. The scheme only supports 1-of-2
election mode. Tian et al. [2] propose a simple Bitcoin voting
protocol which can produce a ballot by a voter selecting at
least kmin at most kmax winners from L candidates. Silvia
et al. [4] proposed the circle shuffle mechanism for Bitcoin
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voting to provide privacy protection, but it requires a cen-
tralized dealer. Meanwhile, there are many papers focusing
on solving the Bitcoin anonymity problem [9], coinjoin [8]
was first to achieve security against stealing mixes by using
group transactions. However, it requires a centralized service
to confuse output addresses. CoinShuffle [8] improves over
Coinjoin by using decryption mixnets for address shuffling
which achieves anonymity against insiders. It has a flaw that
the last one of the shuffling may put his own output address
in the specified location.
The main goals of bitcoin-based e-voting protocols should
include:
• Correctness: The most basic and important nature of an
e-voting agreement is to ensure the correctness of voting
which prevents voters from being falsified, discard or
repeat votes.
• Decentralization: In the entire voting process, in addition
to voters and candidates, no other third-party institutions
or trusted agencies are required to assist in the whole
process.
• Privacy protection: Voting information of voters cannot
be known by anyone else. In reality, privacy protection is
one of the most important attributes of voting protocol.
• Functionality: More forms of voting should be supported,
such as office voting, large-scale election voting, 1-of-2
candidate voting, multiple candidate voting, etc.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Bitcoin transactions
In this article, we do not consider attacks on Bitcoin such
as 51% attacks, routing attacks [9], as well as transaction fee.
We assume that all voters and candidates have access to the
Bitcoin network and the blockchain does not will be forked.
In a simplified bitcoin model, Bitcoin transaction contains
inputs, outputs and value prices. Output can be seen as a
validation of transaction and input script is the papameters(e.g.
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Fig. 1. Entire voting protocol flow diagram.
signature of the previous input)for the program script in the
output. Among them, optional item locktime (t) [5] can ensure
that the transaction will become efftive only after a period of
time t. After(t) [10] means that a single output script can be
made unspendable until t time.
This article also uses a special form of Bitcoin script, P2SH
[11] (Pay-to-Script-Hash), which was introduced in 2012 as a
new, powerful transaction type that greatly simplifies complex
scripts. We use a specific script, the output script is:
OP HASH160 < Hash (x) > OP EQUAL.
The input script is x. As to get the corresponding Bitcoins,
user needs to expose the value of x.
B. Decentralized threshold signature
Threshold secret sharing [12], [13] is a way to split a
secret value into several shares that can be given to different
participants. However, there is an important issue is how to
generate and distribute these shares. The simplest way is to
introduce a trusted dealer who begins with the constructed
key, generates the shares and distributes them to each party.
Of course, this has a weakness in that the trusted dealer is a
single point of failure. Another way is to generate shares of a
key in a distributed manner without ever constructing the key
in the process. Scheme [13] is the ECDSA scheme that works
for arbitrary n and any t < n which is also compatible with
Bitcoin.
While most Bitcoin transactions are spent with a single
signature, Bitcoin in fact specifies a script written in a stack-
based programming language which defines the conditions
under which a transaction may be redeemed. This scripting
languag require at least t-of-n specified ECDSA public keys to
provide a signature on the redeeming transaction. A relatively
recent feature of Bitcoin, pay-to-scripthash, enables payment
to an address that is the hash of a script. When this is
used, senders specify a script hash, and the exact script is
provided by the recipient when funds are redeemed. A quirk
of pay-to-script hash is that the n ≤ 3 restriction is removed
from t-outof-n multisignature transactions. However, due to
a hardcoded limit on the overall size of a hashed script, the
recipients are still limited to n ≤ 15.
All of our constructions that use threshold signatures can be
instantiated with the threshold signature scheme in [13]. We
argue that threshold signatures offer fundamental advantages
stemming from the fact that in the multisignature approach:
• Flexibility. Threshold signatures are more flexible than
multisignatures in the access policies that they permit
as well as in the ability to modify the access policies.
Threshold signatures also allow more flexibility for mak-
ing changes to the access control policy.
• Anonymity. While Bitcoin allows users to be pseudony-
mous, it does not provide any anonymity guarantees.
Indeed, it has been shown that it is not difficult to link
various addresses belonging to a single user. Moreover,
because the entire transaction log is public, once an
address has been associated with a real world identity, one
can immediately view every other transaction associated
with that address.
III. OUR VOTING PROTOCOL
The entire process of our scheme is shown in Fig.1. The
specific process includes registration on the bulletin board
[14], generation of the threshold signature address, anonymous
voting, and Bitcoin transaction stage. We assume that our
Bitcoin voting protocol is used in a small-scale, limited-
power scenario. Suppose there are n voters, each one has his
own Bitcoin address and sufficient balance, and there are m
candidates, if one of them gets t votes or more, then he can
get x Bitcoins from each voter.
A. Registration
For a voter Vi, each voter needs to have an address i
(abbreviated as Ui) which contains at least x + z Bitcoins that x
represents the Bitcoins used to vote and z is used to guarantee
the security of the decryption of vote commitment, the voter
needs to generate and publish his own key pair (pki, ski) for
the shuffling operation in Section III-B. All voters negotiate
the last time t1 of revealing the vote commitment and the latest
time t2 for returning the deposit. If there is no candidate to win
finally. Each candidate needs to prepare an address to obtain
Bitcoin after winning and reveal the key pair (PKx, SKx) (x
indicates the id of the candidate, x ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}). All the
above information is published on the bulletin board. Related
information is also shown in Fig.1.
B. Generation of the threshold signature address
We use the decentralized threshold signature scheme men-
tioned in SectionII-B and each voter interacts to generate the
t-of-n threshold signature address T. For each voter’s skTi
which is the share of T is considered as a valid vote. Each
voter can vote his share to the candidate whom he supports
and the candidate who reaches t shares can receive the nx
Bitcoin rewards at last.
C. Anonymous voting
Based on the relevant design of the shuffle [15], we propose
a new anonymous voting mechanism. Also, we solved the
defect for the last one of shuffling to place his own vote in
a specific position and provided additional verification. This
phase is illustrated in Fig.2.
i. Voter V1 has already known the remaining voters’ public
key pki through the bulletin board and generates his own
vote according to his selection. vote1 = EPKx(skT1 ||idx),
x indicates the candidate chosen by the voter. The
vote1 is encrypted by using pk2, pk3, · · · , pkn to gen-
erate O
pi(1)
1 = Epk2 (Epk3 ( · · ·Epkn(vote1))), where pi (1) is
a random permutation offered by V1. Constructing set
O1=
{
O
pi(1)
1
}
and sending it to V2.
ii. V2 gets O
pi(2)
1 = (Epk3 ( · · ·Epkn(vote1))) after decryption
using his own private key sk2. Meanwhile, V2
selects his vote2 = EPKx(skP2 ||idx) and generates
O
pi(2)
2 = (Epk3 ( · · ·Epkn(vote2))) and then sends
O2=
{
O
pi(2)
1 ,O
pi(2)
2
}
to V3 after construction.
iii. The rest can be done in the same
manner, until Vn gets the final
On=
{
O
pi(n)
1 ,O
pi(n)
2 · · ·O
pi(n)
n
}
= {vote1, vote2, · · · , voten},
the lexicographic order is then sent to all voters.
iv. Each voter hashes the content to get H (i) and broadcasts
to each other to determine if all H (i) are equal. If equals,
each one generates the last round of random permutation
pi (n+ 1) with pseudo-random number generator [16] and
H (i). The purpose of this round is mainly to prevent Vn
from being able to place his vote in specific positions.
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Fig. 2. Anonymous voting based on shuffling.
D. Bitcoin transaction stage
After completing the shuffle operation, any voter can con-
struct vote commitment transaction and refund transaction (see
Fig.3) and then send them to all voters for signature. When
the signature is completed, one voter just publishes the vote
commitment transaction to Bitcoin network and the refund
transaction is kept locally until time t2 which is the last time
for returning ballot funds. The input of vote commitment
transaction includes the address i which owns z+x Bitcoins,
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
The output includes two aspects:
• There are 2 ways to take away z Bitcoins.
(OP HASH160 < Hash(EPKx(skTi ||idx)) > OP EQUAL)
Firstly, it means voter can reveal EPKx(skT1 ||idx) to obtain
his own deposit z Bitcoins.
(T ∧ After(t1))
Secondly, it means that the deposit can be taken away
by the voters jointly construct the transaction or by
the winner candidate who obtians the private key of
T. The purpose of setting a deposit is to prevent voter
from refusing to vote. Therefore, the handle of z Bitcoin
deposit can actually be based on specific actual demands
and designs.
• T is the address which owns nx Bitcoins. For any can-
didate, when the received number of skTi is greater than
t, he can construct a win transaction to obtain the voting
reward.
Claim transaction. Each voter reveals his votei before time
t1. They revealed EPKx(skTi || idx) to recover the deposit si-
multaneously, at the same time, the candidate corresponding
to x decrypt skTi || idx with his private key SKx on the Bitcoin
network.
Win transaction. Once a candidate has collected t different
skTi , he can initiate a win transaction and transfer nx Bitcions
to his own addressx to win the vote.
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Fig. 3. Bitcoin transactions stage.
Refund transaction. If after time t2, the voting result fails to
be generated which means no candidate has obtianed enough
t shares, the refund transaction will be triggered, then each
voter’s x Bitcoins will be returned to the original address Ui.
IV. DISCUSSION
First of all, our solution is correct, vote commitment trans-
action can ensure that each voter has only one vote. They
cannot tamper, discard or repeat the vote after being sent to
Bitcoin network, discard and repeat the voting. The protocol
is decentralized, because of the use of a non-central threshold
signature algorithm, the decentralized shuffling mechanism
and Bitcoin is also decentralized. Privacy protection is mainly
in the shuffling mechanism in Section III-C. It uses the
decryption mixnets to achieve the purpose of protecting vote
privacy. The specific security analysis can be seen in [15].
Considering the number of transactions, our protocol needs
a vote commitment transaction, n claim transactions, and
win/refund transaction in the Bitcoin network, so the complete
process requires n+2 transactions. For functionality, we can
complete the t-of-n voting form. For example, we hope to hold
a election that winner should have more than 50% votes. We
can set n as the number of voters and t as half the number of
voters. Similarly 2/3, 4/5 etc. It makes voting forms actually
more flexible.
Zhao and Chan’s solution [3] used an complex cryptogra-
phy tool such as zero-knowledge proof, it needs to run the
TABLE I
COMPARSION BETWEEN OUR PROTOCOL WITH OTHERS.
Zhao et al [3] Tian et al [2] Silvia et al [4] Our
Correctness ! ! ! !
Decentralization ! ! # !
Privacy
protection
! ! ! !
Transaction
numbers
2n+2 n+2 n+1 n+2
Functionality 1-of-2 [kmin, kmax]
winners
from L
candidates
t-of-n
∀t, t ≤ n
t-of-n
∀n, t ≤ n
zkSNARK 3 times, n-1 secure unicast and 2 times public
broadcast, and the number of transactions is 2n+2, the scheme
can only achieve 1-of-2 election form. Tian et al. [2] proposed
improvements based on the Chan’s protocol that can reduce
the number of transactions to n+2. Unfortunately, it also needs
n (2L+1) proofs of zkSNARK which L is the number of
candidates, L ≥ 1. Silvia et al. [4] put forward the circle
shuffle technique for Bitcoin voting, which also requires only
n+1 transactions, but it requires a centralized honest and
trustable dealer. Once the dealer is malicious, the entire vote
protocol will be destroyed. Table I summarizes the main
differences of our protocol with others.
Future work. Our voting protocol is set in a small-scale
(number of voters restrictions), permission voting scene. For
large-scale voting, we recommend the use of centralized
shamir’s secret sharing program [12], but in fact, Bitcoin is
not a dedicated voting system, its performance will be limited.
Designing a blockchain system that fully serves voting will
probably solve this problem better.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a privacy-preserving, decentralized and func-
tional Bitcoin e-voting protocol that uses a shuffling mecha-
nism to complete privacy protection, decentralized threshold
signatures to assign voting rights, use of Bitcoin transaction
to make all voting transparency and immutability, and the
P2SH scripts can prevent the phenomenon of discarding vote.
The protocol reaches the correctness, decentralization, privacy
protection and has more flexible voting forms. Meanwhile, the
number of transactions maintaines small.
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